

## Chapter 10

# Koreans—A Mistreated Minority in Japan: Hopes and Challenges for Japan's True Internationalization

Soo-im Lee

*As the new millennium dawns, Jōhō (information) is the latest buzzword in Japan, succeeding the catchy kokusaika (internationalization). Collapse of the Japanese economy in the 1990s forced the Japanese to seek greater accountability and information disclosure in business and in other spheres of society. One area, however, has remained only dimly, if at all, lit in Japanese consciousness: the status and plight of the Korean minority in Japan. Few Japanese know about the Koreans' historical background and the cause of their presence in Japanese society. Because Koreans are physically indistinguishable from Japanese and many use Japanese assumed names to avoid likely discrimination, their existence has become practically invisible in Japanese society. Japanese lack awareness of minority problems in their own country, influenced by myths of cultural homogeneity and racial purity, which are still firmly believed by many Japanese. This chapter focuses on two related topics: (1) the superiority and inferiority relationship between Japanese and Koreans from historical perspectives, and (2) the changing consciousness of national identity held by young Japanese and Koreans. Young Japanese have fewer negative feelings toward Koreans than do older people, while young Koreans experience an identity crisis as they try to work out an ethnic identity. Also discussed is government policy concerning foreign residents in light of naturalization procedures, that is still obscured from public view.*

Koreans form the largest foreign minority group in Japan, accounting for 42% of foreign residents, as well as being a well-known target group for Japanese prejudice and discrimination. This large Korean presence goes back to the turn of the 20th century when the colonial takeover of Korea by Japan induced many Koreans to seek work in Japan out of economic necessity, if not as captured laborers, as was the case before and during the Second World War. As it was also Japanese policy, individuals from colonized areas could obtain a kind of limited Japanese citizenship that also carried voting rights.

Koreans in Japan, however, were stripped of their citizenship in 1952 when the San Francisco peace accords were signed between Japan and principally the United States. Because Japanese citizenship is based on lineage, it matters little that many Koreans have known no other country but Japan, having been born and bred there. Despite the fact that many Koreans live their lives as Japanese—speaking the language and following the same customs—their legal status is limited and they are still considered foreigners.

The Japanese word *gaijin* often refers to foreigners and has a negative nuance of an exclusion of foreign elements. Under the Japanese nationality law based on lineage, Koreans must remain *gaijin* no matter how many generations of them have lived in Japan. Leaving Japan is impractical for most Koreans because they only know one home—Japan—and their ancestral home has long been in divided chaos as a result of the former Japanese colonialization and the subsequent division between the Cold War powers. Among Japan's 1.5 million foreign residents,<sup>1</sup> the elderly Korean minority in particular are the victims of Japan's adherence to ideas of racial and cultural homogeneity and deserve to have their case heard. Through such cases of the Koreans, we can gain insight into Japaneseness that we might not otherwise.

As an ethnic Korean myself, born and raised in Japan and currently on the faculty of a Japanese college, I believe I have a unique perspective to share on this topic. I was raised as if I were Japanese, but my Korean ethnicity was such that the "as if" quality could never be permanently removed, often putting me in intercultural situations at a moment's notice. Continually having to function between intra- and intercultural communication with the Japanese gives Koreans much insight into Japanese character from both "insider" and "outsider" perspectives. Koreans gain the "insider perspective" because many of them are physically indistinguishable from Japanese and, if native born to Japan, can pass themselves off as being truly "Japanese."

Average Japanese citizens are naïve about the Korean issue, about their plight and that of other ethnic or social minorities. Consciousness raising is long overdue in Japan, and if the nation is ever to internationalize, it must face these matters. It so happens that with the dawn of the new millennium, a new openness appears to be developing in Japan. *Kokusaiika* (internationalization) has been joined by *Jōhō* (information), the newest buzzword, as national goals. With the collapse of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, Japanese institutions have been

pressed to accept higher accountability and disclosure. In a more open society, ordinary Japanese may finally come to grips with the increasing ethnic and racial diversity in Japan and seek common ground with their foreign brethren.

This chapter looks at the extent to which Japan has actualized its goal for internationalization, while illuminating Japanese values and beliefs in relation to the Korean minority group. The foci of my analysis include the power relation between the two groups and the Korean identity formation process. My method is through personal introspection and a qualitative account of culture-specific discourse. I am a second-generation Korean in Japan and hid my own roots until 18 years of age by using an assumed name of Japanese origin. Such a personal account may be the most direct and revealing way to examine identity issues for social minorities in Japan.

## HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This overview is a bit unusual because I present my own personal history and that of my family. This way may be more meaningful for the reader, for I have directly lived the story. To begin, as a second-generation Korean born and bred in Japan, I went to Japanese schools from the elementary to the university level, so that my environment was quite different from that of Koreans who were formally educated in the *Chongryun* (General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan). Because *Chongryun* is viewed by Japanese as a “formidable Phongyang lobby in Japan” or a “highly disciplined Korean Communist organization in Japan” (Ryang, 1997, p. 11), *Chongryun* Koreans are isolated from mainstream Japanese society and have created their own ethnic culture. I, however, was brought up in an assimilated environment. I speak no Korean and believed that I was the same as any other Japanese until I began to experience discrimination and prejudice later in my childhood. Being discriminated against caused me to question my own identity, leading me, and others like me, to develop an in-between consciousness—one neither “Japanese” nor “Korean.” Korean youths typically develop their consciousness of being non-Japanese and non-Korean under a fully assimilated system in their first phase of identity formation. The experience of discrimination awakens them and forces them to face the social reality and associated problems.

Compared to the first-generation Koreans who had strong ties to their own country, the second-generation Koreans who were raised in a Japanese environment, like me, have been culturally and socially assimilated into the dominant society. However, most of them have had traumatizing experiences of direct or indirect discriminatory treatment and prejudice in Japanese society, even though the degree of discrimination and prejudice differs depending on their situation. I was born in 1953 as the oldest daughter in my family. Because the Alien Registration Law was implemented in 1952, I was born as a Korean despite the fact that my father had Japanese citizenship up to that point. My father’s family

background depicts a typical case of the plight of the Korean migrants during the period of colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. There was a large influx of Koreans into Japan in search of jobs as a direct result of land confiscation managed by imperial Japan from 1910 to 1918 (Fukuoka, 1996; Kan & Kim, 1994; Lee & De Vos, 1981). Many married men left their families behind in Korea and migrated to Japan alone. My grandfather was one of these men.

After my grandfather left for Japan, my grandmother soon followed him without his knowledge. She took along with her my father, then only 4 years of age. Hers was a brave act because Korean women were not easily permitted to migrate to Japan. My grandmother hid herself and my father in the bottom of a fishing boat for the whole trip. Somehow they caught up with my grandfather and began to live in a small village in Wakayama, south of Osaka, Japan. My father tells us that the most difficult time for them was when no one in the village wanted to rent a house to this newly arrived Korean family. They still managed, and in time, my father learned the language and literacy, becoming a guide for his parents in this foreign land. My father calls Wakayama his hometown despite the hard life that they had.

My maternal grandfather also migrated to Japan under similar circumstances. He, however, was to lose his life during the hysteria in Tokyo during the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. He was victimized as one of the 6,000 Koreans massacred by Japanese rioters who believed an ill rumor that Koreans would rise up to take over Tokyo. Japanese vigilantes forced Koreans to speak certain sounds<sup>2</sup> (Kuboi, 1996) to detect and, on this basis, kill those who were believed to be Korean. This case is a tragic reminder of how language can become a powerful weapon by which the mainstream or majority exercises control over a minority. Those with speech impediments and also those with different Japanese regional accents, even if Japanese, were victimized during the 6-day massacre.

### **Politically and Socially Deprived Status Given to Koreans**

After Japan's defeat in World War II, about 2 million Koreans were given the choice of either going back to Korea or remaining as secondary citizens in Japan. Relatives on both sides of my family wanted to return to Korea, but my mother's parents, who were financially stable, decided to remain in Japan. My father's parents went back to Tegu, their Korean hometown, with their seven children. My father, 21 years old at the time, could not adjust himself to the unfamiliar culture and language. In Korea, people mocked his accented Korean and bullied him because of his Japanized behavior. The Korean hostility was understandable, but it still forced my father to return to Japan by himself, leaving his family and siblings behind. Soon after, in 1950, the Korean War broke out, which meant that he and his family did not see each other for 15 years, until Japan normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965. One of his younger brothers was drafted into the South Korean army, became a prisoner of war, and was taken as a cap-

tive to North Korea. On reflection, my father cynically laughs that his Japanese identity saved him from becoming a casualty of war.

Yun (1992) points out that the native Korean identity for first-generation Koreans served as a bulwark against the social injustices received. For the sake of their children, they struggled within the gap between assimilation and separation and survived despite being outside the mainstream. They knew that they could never return to their home country and would likely lose some of their own Korean culture and identity.

Few Japanese know that Koreans held limited Japanese citizenship until 1952. Even though they were considered Japanese nationals, colonial subjects were not to be accorded the same respected status as Japanese citizens. The *koseki* system (family registry), as applied to Koreans, meant that their family registry (*chōsen koseki*, Korean family registry) was clearly distinguished from the Japanese *koseki* (*naichi koseki*) (Tanaka, 1990). Lee and De Vos criticize the discriminatory treatment against Koreans using the different *koseki* under the assimilation policy for colonial subjects. However, as imperial subjects, 38,912 Korean men were eligible to vote in the election of September 1931,<sup>3</sup> and a few Koreans were elected to the Japanese Diet (Lee & De Vos, 1981, pp. 136–137). Understandably, these Korean politicians were loyal to the imperial Japanese government and supported the government's policy on Koreans.

As mentioned before, Japanese citizenship was stripped away without giving Koreans the choice, in contrast to Germany's humane treatment of citizens from countries it had colonized during World War II. Such people in Germany were offered citizenship, and many took it. In Japan, the Alien Registration Law restricted the lives of Koreans, and they have been treated as foreigners ever since. As foreigners, they were subjected to being fingerprinted periodically, having to be in possession of an alien identity card at all times, and having to apply for a reentry permit anytime they went abroad for a visit. Violation of any of these provisions could mean severe legal punishments, including compulsory expulsion.

## THE NATIONAL IDENTITY CREATED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

In spite of Japan's obsession with internationalization over the past two decades, the Japanese still implicitly consent to the inferior status accorded Koreans in Japan. Historically, Japanese believed that they were biologically superior to Koreans (Lee & De Vos, 1981). Given that Japanese and Koreans are of the same "race," how did the racism against Koreans develop?

The Japanese national identity has been politically and economically created for the swift promotion of industrialization and militarization ever since Japan's postrestoration Meiji era (Kan & Kim, 1994; Suh, 1987; Yoshioka, 1995; Yoshioka, Inui, Kawase, & Yamamoto, 1984). The Japanese national identity consists of a complexity of feelings of superiority toward the East and inferiority

toward the West as a direct result of its historical drive to surpass Western civilization. It makes sense that if Japanese felt inferior to Westerners, then they might seek a compensatory way to shore up their pride through other Asian countries. Korea, being Japan's closest neighbor and economically behind Japan, became a convenient target for ego gratification while reinforcing Japanese ethnocentrism before and during World War II. This ethnocentric outlook formed a basis for Japanese national identity to be politically harnessed for the swift advancement of the nation.

Concomitant with the nation's militaristic periods in the 1930s and 1940s, an ethnocentric fever swept Japan producing a mass literature that celebrated Japanese racial purity. For example, "the putative relationship between blood and culture was made more explicit in Tetsuji Kada's *Jinshu Minzoku Sensō* (Race, Ethnicity, and War), published in 1938" (Weiner, 1997, p. 2). Kada consistently affirmed the biological basis of *minzoku* (ethnicity) by distinguishing it from *jinshu* (race) and supported belief in the purity of Japanese blood. Purity of blood, as expressed in "racial" homogeneity, reinforced Japanese collectivity, and it was politically used to change the family-state into a militarized nation.

This racialized ideology explains the mistreatment of minorities, even of their own people—the *burakumin*, formerly outcasted Japanese. It was a common belief early this century that "*burakumin* were racially distinct from mainstream Japanese; that they were the descendants of slaves from the ancient period, descendants of Koreans, or even descendants of the lost tribes of Israel that somehow ended up in Japan" (Neary, 1997, p. 53). Others were categorized on the basis of their non-Japanese blood, regardless of quantity. For example, even if Ainu (an indigenous people) were able to conceal their ancestry, they might still be marked by physical appearance. Even if they succeeded in passing as Japanese, they often must live in fear of discovery (Siddle, 1997). This is a similar pattern to that of the naturalized Koreans who hide their ethnic origins by erasing the evidence from their newly formed family registry (Kim, 1990). The popular literature on *Nihonjinron* ("discussions of the Japanese" or "theories of Japaneseness," which appeared in the late 1960s and 1970s) was a reflection of a revitalized cultural nationalism (Yoshino, 1992) and indicated Japan's struggle for power as the society became increasingly Westernized (Befu, 1987). This literature emphasized not only Japanese uniqueness, but also the superiority of Japanese culture over other cultures (Weiner, 1997).

Whether or not Japanese cultural nationalism is racially based, the Japanese still maintain today a superiority complex, even if in a new form. Hicks (1998) observes that

even though the Japanese are proud of their own uniqueness they do not necessarily look down on others as inherently inferior, but rather judge them in terms of "perceived achievement." Successful Western countries are looked up to, but Asian societies seen as

less successful than Japan are looked down upon. Korea is ranked rather low, because of its former status as a Japanese colony. (p. 5)

Ryang (1997) also questions why and under what circumstances “certain foreigners are politely treated and others are bluntly insulted, exploited, and looked down upon” (p. 9). Japanese swiftly changed their perceptions toward Americans from devils to the most admired group in the postwar period, as the most popular foreign culture for Japanese is American (Hagiwara, 1998). Many Caucasians confess that they are treated politely by Japanese, and one American woman even described her own experience in Japan as being treated as if she were a queen. Of course much depends on people’s situations and their expectations. Still, within Japan’s hierarchy of social minority groups, Caucasians as a group receive more respect than do other non-Japanese groups.

### **The Lack of Intercultural Understanding**

The first-generation Koreans brought their own culture and lifestyles into the Japanese communities and “Japanese could not comprehend that the observable behavioral differences of the first-generation Koreans were because of differences in cultural heritage” (Sato, 1991, p. 21). Hoffman (1992) points out the difference in communication style between the two groups. The Korean direct and straightforward style causes Japanese to perceive them as being aggressive or rude. Conversely, Japanese are famous for their high-context communication style (Hirai, 1994; Samovar & Porter, 1991), and “the two attitudes of *hon’ne* (true feelings) and *tatemae* (face value) cause Koreans to distrust Japanese because they appear two-faced to Koreans” (Hoffman, 1992, p. 483). Most of the first-generation Koreans who migrated to Japan were uneducated and illiterate in both languages. On top of the extreme poverty in their lives, their attitudinal and behavioral patterns looked aggressive to many Japanese. Japanese parents told their children to stay away from the Korean communities, which implicitly instilled fear in their young minds.

### **The Development of a Korean Inferiority Complex**

The second-generation Koreans who were educated and assimilated into Japanese society became ashamed of their own roots after realizing who they really were. When out with my Japanese friends, I often ignored my grandparents, if they came into eyesight, and hoped that they would not notice or talk to me in front of my friends. Many second-generation Koreans share similar memories, which indicates the social stigma they must face. The power relationship between Japanese and Koreans turns on this social stigma and is fueled by Japanese belief of their homogeneity and exclusionary attitudes toward foreign-

ers. For Japan-born Koreans, the likely result is alienation from their own Korean ethnicity and an insecure identity. This is the price that must be paid for assimilation into Japanese society, for Hoffman (1992) can attest that Korean newcomers to Japan (and thus not yet assimilated) have strongly intact Korean identities.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN PERSONAL IDENTITY

Personal identity is based on various elements, such as gender, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and sexual orientation (Tajfel, 1981, 1982). Martin and Nakayama (1997) distinguish ethnic identity from national identity. They note that even though the ethnic roots of the minority groups in the United States are diversified, their nationality is American. The majority of second- and third-generation Koreans do not share much cultural and social identity with Korean nationals, but rather with Japanese (Fukuoka, 1996; Fukuoka & Tsujiyama, 1991). The primary difference between Japan-born Koreans and Japanese is the deprived legal status of Koreans.

Martin and Nakayama (1997) state that identity consciousness of the minority groups develops earlier than that of the majority group (pp. 76–77). If this view also applies to Japan-born Korean youth, then their ethnicity will likely become a sensitive issue, one not shared by Japanese youth. They will realize that they are discriminated against in many aspects of their lives and may feel alienated in Japanese society. The identity held by assimilated Koreans, however, is an ethnic one because they have embraced few Korean cultural values or beliefs. Kim (1999) is one of the few sociopolitical researchers who has conducted a statistical analysis on the formation of ethnicity in Korean youth in Japan, and his findings indicate that family, Korean community, language use, and education have significant causal relationships with ethnicity formation. He also found that the experiences of suffering discrimination and prejudice had an indirect influence on their development, causing deprived and negative feelings.

### Different Acculturation Patterns

A large number of case studies were conducted based on interview data gathered from over 150 Korean youth by Fukuoka and Tsujiyama (1991) and Fukuoka (1996). The Korean youth in the study were categorized under four different patterns of acculturation according to family beliefs and environment. Fukuoka's purpose was to investigate the changing awareness or consciousness of the new Korean generation including the diversified values and beliefs of the Korean minority, which cannot be generalized into one pattern.

The first type, called the Nationalists, are those who want to maintain their status as resident foreign nationals and are not interested in being assimilated into Japanese society. Many of those who were educated in the *Chongryun* environment fit into this group. The second type, the Pluralists, are those who aim to



solve the problem of social discrimination through social and political activities initiated in their own communities. The third type, the Individualists, are represented by those who believe that financial success in society is achieved by using one's ability, and that their chosen values and beliefs are to fight back against social discrimination by liberating themselves. They are not particularly concerned with ethnic Korean history or their roots; nor do they feel an attachment to either Japan or Korea in their relationship as individuals to the state. The last type is the Naturalization Oriented Individuals, and their main concern is to become Japanese. They believe that by assimilating they can live without experiencing ethnic discrimination. Japan-born Koreans chose an acculturation pattern in order to survive in their exploited lives, and some of them are satisfied with attaining a materialistically comfortable lifestyle.

In my case, I declared myself a Korean (*honmyō sengen*) at my high school graduation ceremony. My high school teacher gave me a choice of whether I would be called by my Japanese or Korean name. It was a difficult choice for me because I thought I might lose my friends if they found out my ethnic roots. If I recalled my own experience, the inferiority complex was deeply rooted in my mind and the best way to protect myself was to pretend to be Japanese using my Japanese assumed names.

However, my coming out experience in using my own Korean name was the second phase of my identity formation. My internal struggle forced me to be sensitively aware of my own personal identity and my Japanese friends' supportive attitude was the main factor that strengthened my confidence and self-determination.

## OVERCOMING THE WE-THEY RELATIONSHIPS

Now more than 50 years have passed since the end of World War II, and with increased internationalization and globalization within Japan, a shift in power relations with minorities has occurred. Until recently, naturalized Koreans were required to take Japanese names in compliance with the government assimilation policy (Kim, 1990). These Korean Japanese became an invisible social minority while the myth of complete homogeneity was maintained under this policy. However, the victories of naturalized aliens who sued to keep their ethnic names have resulted in gradual changes in government policy.

Recently, Koreans have become eligible to apply for the national pension, government housing loans, and child allowances, when the Japanese government modified its domestic laws to accommodate Vietnamese refugees in the early 1980s. The human rights movement has also led to one Korean's refusal to be fingerprinted, becoming a mass movement of 10,000 Koreans. The fingerprinting requirement was eventually scrapped for foreign residents, who mostly consist of Koreans, and the government scheduled its complete abolishment in the year 2000 (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 1999, Aug. 15). Recently, I often have been invited by Japanese junior and senior high schools to give a workshop for their stu-

dents regarding the situation of Koreans in Japan. I have come to realize that many of the teachers do not know how to deal with the situation, but they still feel obligated to help Korean students, who generally hide their ethnic roots by using Japanese names. Although I found a few who use their Korean names—and courageously so—most still use Japanese names and pretend to be Japanese.

Japanese consciousness toward Koreans is gradually changing, and intellectuals, scholars, and educators are particularly concerned with this long-lasting social stigma in Japan. Many Japanese youth do not necessarily have negative ideas about Koreans, even though they may be unaware of the historical facts (Hicks, 1998; Tanaka, 1995; Uchiyama, 1982). Along with this softening of attitudes in youths, the increase in intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans (Sakanaka, 1999) indicates that belief in the purity of blood is not as strong as before. Another factor is the reassessment by Japanese of traditional management practices in business, due to the stagnant economy of the 1990s. Japan's first modern experience with sustained slow growth affected Japanese values and beliefs. The Japanese public has demanded accountability and information disclosure from official authorities. Such trends have influenced practices in the schools as well. Individuality, originality, creativity, critical thinking, and self-expression are values or goals gaining attention, which could eventually diminish certain traditional practices, practices that ultimately encourage belief in Japanese complete homogeneity, such as emphases on cooperative attitude, harmonious relationships, and group-oriented thinking.

In English education in Japan, for example, the importance of cultural understanding is included in educational guidelines set forth by the Ministry of Education for the junior and the senior high school levels (Hatori, 1996). Cultural understanding and intercultural communication are now considered two of the most important research and pedagogical interests in ESL. The purpose of learning English is seen more and more as communicating with the outside world in the global network. The Internet, of course, has had a great impact in this regard, especially by making global communications available for all. This development will remove English ability from the sole province of social elites (Sugiura, 1999). The potential equalizing effects in Japanese society appear bright. Japan may have an unprecedented opportunity to overcome the we-they relationships with others within Japanese society and in the world at large.

Technological innovation, especially the Internet, helps Japanese and Koreans to communicate on an individual level (Tsuiji, 1999). Exchange programs through e-mail are increasing between Japanese schools and Korean schools. It is apparent that today is the most promising time to deepen cultural understanding between the two countries. Because Koreans know what happened to them during Japan's colonial period, they have tended to get too emotional about Japan. Nevertheless, when it comes to business and economics, Koreans readily can view Japan as a model. In this regard, a book written by a Japanese businessman, Momose (1998), titled *Kankoku ga shindemo Nihonjin ni oitsukenai 18 no riryū* (Eighteen Facts Why

Korea Would Never Catch Up with Japan in Business), became a best-selling book in Korea. Although this may drive some nationalistic sentiment, more importantly the interest shows a willingness to view Japan more realistically. Economic emulation could lead to more positive feelings for the nation.

## HOPES AND CHALLENGES FOR TRUE INTERNATIONALIZATION

Korean scholars Kan and Kim (1994) suggest the continued social stigma of Koreans would be alleviated by the automatic granting of citizenship to them. Some optimism has emerged in a published book by a Japanese immigration official, Sakanaka (1999), who encourages the betterment of relations between Japanese and Koreans and predicts that the Korean disadvantages would eventually disappear if Koreans were afforded more moderate legal treatment, such as simplified procedures for naturalization. De Vos and Wetherall (1983) suggest that one effective, but revolutionary, solution would be to adopt an *ius soli* basis for awarding citizenship to all those born in Japan and, thus, grant most Koreans automatic citizenship (p. 11). Sakanaka warned that the forced assimilation policy would not help solve minority problems, and he implied that the more moderate immigration laws are implemented toward the Koreans, the faster their genuine assimilation into society would be. This would also lead to an accelerated acceptance of the new identity by Korean residents. He even added that ethnic cultural preservation would be possible if naturalized Koreans start using their ethnic names after being naturalized.

Koreans, however, are often surprised and discouraged to learn about the Japanese ignorance of historical facts. It is apparent that the Japanese way of teaching the historical facts is different from the Korean way. The Korean high school students who were interviewed on a Japanese TV program said that "Japan's sincere attitude would be assessed from now on because our friendship has just started and we are obliged to develop it further" (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, 1999, Aug. 15). The bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea significantly affects the status of Korean residents in Japan and Japan's policy will be evaluated in many aspects, not only by Korea, but also by the international community. The treatment given to Koreans is one of the most crucial tests of Japan's efforts to demonstrate its true internationalization.

## NOTES

1. The largest group, Koreans (South Koreans and North Koreans, including new-comer Koreans), accounts for 42.2%; the second largest, Chinese (including Taiwanese), accounts for 18%; and the third largest group, Brazilians (which is drastically increasing), accounts for 14.7% of the total number of foreign residents in Japan (Hōmushō, 2001).

2. Koreans could not pronounce particular voiced sounds, so that they were forced to pronounce "*Jyugo en Jyugo sen*" (Fifteen yen and fifteen sen) or "ga gi gu ge go" sounds.
3. Korean voting rights were taken away right after the war ended in 1945.

## REFERENCES

- Befu, H. (1987). *Ideorogī to shite no Nihon bunkaron* [The theory of Japanese culture as an ideology]. Tokyo: Shiso no kagaku-sha.
- De Vos, G., & Wetherall, W. (1983). *Japan's minorities: Burakumin, Koreans, Ainu, Okinawans* (Report No. 3). London: The Minority Rights Group Ltd.
- Fukuoka, Y. (1996). Beyond assimilation and dissimilation: Diverse resolutions to identify crises among younger generation Koreans in Japan. *Saitama University Review*, 31(2), 1-30.
- Fukuoka, Y., & Tsujiyama, Y. (1991). *Dōka to ika no hazamade: Zainichi wakamono sedai no identity no katto* [Assimilation and dissimilation: Korean youth's identity crisis]. Tokyo: Sofukan.
- Hagiwara, S. (1998). Japanese television as a window on other cultures. *Japanese Psychological Research*, 40, 221-223.
- Hatori, H. (1996). *Kokusai kano nakano Eigo kyouiku* [Japan's internationalization and English education]. Tokyo: Sanseido.
- Hicks, G. (1998). *Japan's hidden apartheid: The Korean minority and the Japanese*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Hirai, K. (1994). Kotoba to bunka. In N. Honna, B. Hoffer, K. Akiyama, & Y. Takeshita (Eds.), *Ibunka rikai to communication* [Cross cultural communication]. Tokyo: Sanshusha.
- Hōmushō. (2001). *Zairyugaikokujin tokei, Heisei 12nen* [The year 2000 statistics in immigration]. Japanese Ministry of Justice.
- Hoffman, D. (1992). Changing faces, changing places: The new Koreans in Japan. *Japan Quarterly*, (October-December), 479-489.
- Kada, T. (1938). *Jinshu minzoku sensō* [Race, ethnicity, and war]. Tokyo: Keio Shobo.
- Kan, J., & Kim, D. (1994). *Zainichi Kankoku, Chōsenjin rekishi to tenbō* [The history of Koreans in Japan and their future perspectives]. Tokyo: Rodo Keizaisha.
- Kim, M. (1999). *Minzokuteki kyushinryoku no keiseiron LISREL o mochiita ingakankei-bunseki* [Ethnicity formation in the analysis of structural equation modeling using LISREL]. Available online: <http://www.han.org/a/vita.html>
- Kim, Y. (1990). *Zainichi Chōsenjin no kika* [Naturalization of Koreans in Japan]. Tokyo: Akashi shoten.
- Kuboi, N. (1996). *Chōsen to Nihon no rekishi* [The history of Korea and Japan]. Tokyo: Akashi shoten.
- Lee, C., & De Vos, G. (1981). *Koreans in Japan: Ethnic conflict and accommodation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Martin, J., & Nakayama, T. (1997). *Intercultural communication in contexts*. Mountainview, CA: Mayfield Publishing.
- Momose, T. (1998). *Kankoku ga shindemo Nihon ni oitsukenai 18 no riryū* [Eighteen facts why Korea would never catch up with Japan in business]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu.
- Neary, I. (1997). Burakumin in contemporary Japan. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's minorities: The illusion of homogeneity*. New York: Routledge.

- Nippon Hoso Kyokai. (1999, Aug. 15). *NHK special: Tonari no kuni wa partner, kako o norikoe kyusekkin* [Neighboring country, Korea: Overcoming the past] (TV program).
- Ryang, S. (1997). *North Koreans in Japan: Language, ideology, and identity*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sakanaka, E. (1999). *Zainichi Kankoku Chosenjin seisakuron no tenkai* [Japan's policy regarding Korean minority]. Tokyo: Nippon Kajo Shuppan.
- Samovar, L., & Porter, R. (1991). *Intercultural communication*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Sato, K. (1991). *Zainichi Kankoku Chosenjin ni tou* [Questions to Koreans in Japan]. Tokyo: Akishobo.
- Siddle, R. (1997). Ainu: Japan's indigenous people. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's minorities: The illusion of homogeneity*. New York: Routledge.
- Sugiura, M. (1999). *Internet to gaikokugo no jyuugyou* [The Internet and its effect on the English education in Japan]. Available online: <http://lang.nagoya-u.ac.jp/~sugiura/ed1997-06-30/gengobunkadayori.html>
- Suh, Y. (1987). *Kankoku Chosenjin no genjyo to shōrai* [The present and future of Koreans in Japan]. Tokyo: Shakai Horon-sha.
- Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human categories and social groups*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1982). *Social identity and intergroup relations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tanaka, H. (1990). *Kyomo no kokusai kokka Nippon: Asia no shiten kara* [Illusionary internationalization in Japan: From Asian perspectives]. Tokyo: Rodo Keizaisha.
- Tanaka, H. (1995). *Zainichi gaikokujin* [Foreign residents in Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Tsuji, Y. (1999). Internet o tsukatta Kankoku to no kokusai kyoryu [Intercultural communication with Korean students via the Internet]. *Education and Information*, No. 490 (January), 8–11.
- Uchiyama, K. (1982). *Zainichi Chosenjin to kyōiku: Chosen o shiru kyōzai to jissen* [Education regarding the Korean minority: Related materials and pedagogical practices]. Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo.
- Weiner, M. (1997). The invention of identity: "Self" and "other" in pre-war Japan. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's minorities: The illusion of homogeneity*. New York: Routledge.
- Yoshino, K. (1992). *Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan*. London: Routledge.
- Yoshioka, M. (1995). *Zainichi gaikokujin to shakai hoshō* [Foreign residents in Japan and their social welfare]. Tokyo: Taihei Insatsu-sha.
- Yoshioka, M., Inui, S., Kawase, S., & Yamamoto, H. (1984). *Zainichi Chosenjin to shakai-hoshō* [Koreans in Japan and their social welfare]. Tokyo: Shakai Horon-sha.
- Yun, K. (1992). *Zainichi o ikiruto wa*. [Living as a Korean in Japanese society]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.